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东、提高上市公司信息披露质量的途径显得非常重要。20 世纪 80 年代以来机构
投资者的迅速发展壮大，为公司治理机制提供了新途径。 
















































Good quality of information disclosure is an important cornerstone to ensure 
effective operation of capital market.However,in countries with highly concentrated 
ownership structure, listed companies’ decision-making of information disclosure is 
almost controlled by ultimate controlling shareholder,who tends to carry out the 
action of “tunneling” to obtain private benefits from small and medium shareholders. 
Information disclosure thus becomes a tool to mask their private benefits of 
control.Therefore,it is very important to explore some way to balance the power of 
ultimate controlling shareholder and enhance the quality of information 
disclosure.Since the 1980s,the rapid development and growth of institutional investors 
has provided a new way for the mechanism of corporate governance. 
Using the sample of listed companies in Shenzhen Security Market over the 
period of 2004-2008, this paper empirically tests the impact of ultimate control, 
institutional ownership and their interaction effect on the quality of information 
disclosure.Research on this issue can indirectly confirm the entrenchment effect of 
ultimate controlling shareholder.Also it can answer the question of the relationship 
between our country’s institutional investors and corporate governance. The results 
show: 
(1) In line with the entrenchment effect,the quality of information disclosure is 
negatively related to the separation of two rights; 
(2) The nature of ultimate controlling shareholder has no significant impact on 
the quality of information disclosure; 
(3) The quality of information disclosure is positively related to institutional 
ownership.Stock holding of institutional investors can play an active role in 
improving the quality of information disclosure.With the rising of institutional 
ownership,the quality of information disclosure of listed companies improves 
accordingly; 
(4) Stock holding of institutional investors can alleviate the negative relationship 
between the separation of two rights and the quality of information disclosure,playing 
a role of restriction; 














information disclosure enhancing with the rising of institutional ownership is lower 
than that in state-owned listed companies. 
In a word,Chinese institutional investors have the Institutional Shareholder 
Activism motive and capability.They can inhibit the motive of ultimate controlling 
shareholder’s behavior of tunneling at root,thereby enhancing the quality of 
information disclosure and protecting the interests of small and medium 
shareholders.However, in sate-owned listed companies,institutional investors’ action 
of Institutional Shareholder Activism has limited effect.They has poorer effect to 
inhibit ultimate controlling shareholder’s action of tunneling and enhance the quality 
of information disclosure.Therefore,in order to enable institutional investors play a 
positive role, safeguard of related Property System is needed in our country. 
The innovation of this research is reflected in the following aspects: 
(1) In previous research on the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
governance,most scholars focused on the first-class principal-agent issues,very few 
scholars were concerned about the second-class principal-agent issues.This paper 
incorporates institutional investors and ultimate control into a unified analytical 
framework,which is helpful in testing the governance effect of institutional investors 
from a new perspective; 
(2) This paper has considered our country’s special background of government 
intervention.Research about the impact of the nature of ultimate controlling 
shareholder on institutional investors’ action of Institutional Shareholder Activism is 
conducted in this paper. 
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